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On the Determinants of Organizational Forgetting†
By Guy David and Tanguy Brachet*
Studies of organizational learning and forgetting identify potential
channels through which the firm’s production experience is lost.
These channels have differing implications for efficient resource allocation within the firm, but their relative importance has been ignored
to date. We develop a framework for distinguishing the contributions
of labor turnover and human capital depreciation to organizational
forgetting. We apply our framework to a novel dataset of ambulance
companies and their workforce. We find evidence of organizational
forgetting, which results from skill decay and turnover effects. The latter has twice the magnitude of the former. (JEL D23, D83, J24, J63)

S

everal recent studies have estimated organizational forgetting rates for firms in
specific industries (Linda Argote, Sara L. Beckman, and Dennis Epple 1990;
Eric Darr, Argote, and Epple 1995; Epple, Argote, and Kenneth Murphy 1996; C.
Lanier Benkard 2000; Peter Thompson 2007; Gautam Gowrisankaran, Vivian Ho,
and Robert Town 2006). Organizational forgetting occurs when the firm’s stock of
production experience depreciates over time (Argote, Beckman, and Epple 1990).
The depreciation of organizational knowledge is thought to involve a number of
factors, including individual, technological, environmental, and work force changes
(Argote 1999). We argue that these factors lead to organizational forgetting through
their effects on the value of human capital. In particular, there are two broad channels through which forgetting at the firm level may occur: the depreciation of human
capital (Winfred Arthur, Jr. et al. 1998) and labor turnover, whereby experienced
employees are replaced by new ones.
These channels of organizational forgetting are important when there is technological change or failure to record firm experience. When human capital is imperfectly transferrable across technologies, technological change lowers the value of
individual experience and hence leads to smaller negative turnover effects, as new
technologies render existing human capital obsolete. Similarly, a failure to record
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firm experience may exacerbate both human capital depreciation (as existing
workers lack records to refresh their memories or reinforce routines) and turnover
effects (as new workers do not have access to an organizational body of knowledge).
Distinguishing between human capital depreciation and labor turnover effects is
important for resource allocation within firms. However, because existing studies
have relied on organizational level data, they cannot make this distinction.
There is an extensive literature on skill decay and skill retention among individuals (Arthur et al. 1998; Argote 1999). Most broadly, skill decay refers to the
deterioration of acquired skills over time. The amount learned and the passage of
time are the two most important determinants of skill decay (Charles D. Bailey
1989). Individual competence is commonly measured in terms of either speed or
accuracy, with speed being more prone to depreciate over time (Susan Bodilly et al.
1986). The distinction between speed and accuracy is important since most studies
of organizational forgetting focus on industries in which production processes are
characterized by fixed-sequence tasks (e.g., following a protocol), for which skill
decay has been shown to be most pronounced (Joseph D. Hagman and Andrew M.
Rose 1983).
The empirical evidence on the effect of labor turnover on organizational forgetting is mixed (Argote, Beckman, and Epple 1990; Argote 1999; Thompson 2007).
Labor turnover effects are potentially important when the human capital acquired by
former workers is less valuable to current performance than that of current employees. However, without data on the employment histories of workers, previous studies had to measure a firm’s experience stock as the accumulated experiences of all
workers, whether currently employed or not.
A combination of task, market, and industry-specific characteristics govern the
relative importance of skill decay and labor turnover in shaping organizational
forgetting. The two channels imply different strategies to mitigate organizational
forgetting. For instance, retention policies to reduce labor turnover may include
improved compensation packages or safe working environments. On the other hand,
skill decay may be slowed by limiting periods of inactivity or frequent refreshers.
For example, more flexibility in scheduling may appeal to workers and so lessen
turnover rates. But strict scheduling designed to reduce periods of inactivity may
slow skill decay.
We provide a framework for studying the relative contributions of labor turnover effects and skill decay to organizational forgetting. Most studies of organizational learning and forgetting have focused on large scale industrial settings. In
contrast, this paper focuses on a setting in the service sector. We study traumarelated ambulance runs in Mississippi between 1991 and 2005. The nature of
emergency medical services (EMS) allows us to attribute performance to individual paramedics, and thus measure human capital depreciation in a profession
in which individual skills may decay, and in an industry with high labor turnover
rates. Indeed, we find that both human capital depreciation and turnover contribute
to organizational forgetting, with turnover effects having twice the magnitude of
individual skill decay.
Because we can track individual performance, we can study individual human
capital depreciation directly. We consider the effects of individual production
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inactivity and the scope of tasks (interference), two mechanisms commonly associated with skill decay.1
The paper is organized as follows: Section I describes our framework for
measuring human capital depreciation and labor turnover effects in the context
of organizational forgetting. In Section II, we adapt the framework to the EMS
setting to measure the contributions of individual production inactivity and the
scope of tasks to human capital depreciation. In Section III, we describe the data
and other determinants of performance. In Section IV, we discuss our results.
Section V concludes.
I. Framework

The human capital of individual i may be defined as the total stock of past produc i,tis the experience accrued by individual
tion experiences, e i,t = ei,t−1 + ϕi,t where ϕ
i between t − 1 and time t and ei,t the experience accumulated by t.2 However, this
formulation does not allow for forgetting, nor for the greater salience (or, perhaps,
relevance) of recent experience. The drawback of this approach is that an experience
from the distant past is treated as perfect substitute for a recent one.
A more flexible definition of human capital, referred to as the forgetting model
(Argote, Beckman, and Epple 1990; Benkard 2000; Gowrisankaran, Ho, and Town
2006; Thompson 2007), defines experience by
(1) 	ei,t = λ ei,t−1 + ϕi,t.
The parameter λ allows for forgetting (i.e., λ < 1) and captures the intuition that
less recent experiences may be less relevant for today’s performance. Here (1 − λ)
can be viewed as the rate of human capital depreciation.
 t  ≡ Nt−1 − 
Let Nt be the number of employees in the firm in period t, such that N
mt + nt, where mt and nt are the number of employees exiting and entering the firm
between t − 1 and t, respectively.
We partition the firm’s experience in period t into three mutually exclusive groups:
N −m
N −m
 t−1 − mt stayers, corre[λ ∑ i=1t−1 t ei,t−1 + ∑ i=1t−1 t ϕi ,t]  is the human capital of N
Nt
 ϕ ]  is the recent experience accumulated
sponding to equation (1); μ [∑ i=Nt−1
 −mt+1 i,t
by the n t entrants, where the parameter μ represents the value to the firm of new
t−1
mj
k,t−1
  e
 ] is the value of past experience of
employee experience; and [γ ∑ j=1 ∑ k=1
all exitors, allowing the firm to retain a different proportion, γ, of exitors’ human
capital, where j indexes the exit period of individual k, and the value to the firm of
k,t−1
 .3
former employee k’s human capital evolves according to e
 k,t = γ  e
1
Individual level data is not sufficient for studying individual skill decay. One must also attribute performance
to individuals, as in the case of EMS.
2
In large scale manufacturing settings, experience is measured in production units, such as the number of aircraft produced (Benkard 2000), the number of ships built (Thompson 2007), etc. In EMS, experience is measured
as the volume of emergencies.
3
Note that for simplicity, we assume no employee reentry to the firm.
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The sum of the three components, presented in equation (2), is the value of the
firm’s cumulative experience in period t,

[

Nt−1−mt

Nt−1−mt

i=1

i=1

] [

] [

t−1 mj

Nt

k,t−1
  + ∑  ϕi , t  + γ ∑ ∑   e
   +     μ ∑
(2)	
Et = λ ∑  ei,t−1
j=1 k=1

]

 ϕi ,t .

i=Nt−1−mt+1

Individual worker identifiers, as in equation (1), are essential for decomposing
organizational forgetting into human capital depreciation and turnover effects. In
the absence of individual level data, the distinction between forgetting that arises
through the loss of human capital accumulated by individuals who left the firm and
human capital depreciation of workers still employed by the firm cannot be made.
Similarly, the distinction between the contribution of recent experience of veterans
and that of new employees cannot be made.
These limitations impose strong assumptions on the sources for organizational
forgetting. Specifically, they assume perfect exchangeability of past experience on
current performance across all employees, including those who are no longer in the
firm.
To see this, we can write the cumulative experience profiles for the firm as:

[

Nt−1
 −mt

t−1 mj

i=1

j=1 k=1

] [

Nt−1
 −mt

Nt

i=1

i=Nt−1
 −mt+1

˜ t = λ   ∑  ei,t−1 + ∑ ∑   e
  k*, t−1  +   ∑  ϕi , t +   ∑
(3)	 E

]

 ϕi ,t ,

8
8
˜ t−1	qt
	 E

where E
  ˜ t is the value of aggregate experience of all current and past employees
in period t. The first bracketed term on the right hand-side of equation (3) is the
sum of experience accumulated by individuals up to (and including) period t − 1
(i.e., E
  ˜ t−1). This term is determined by individuals who are still employed by the
firm in period t and those who were no longer with the firm as of t − 1, terms that
are impossible to construct separately without individual level data.4 The second
bracketed term, qt, is the sum of the recent experiences accumulated between t − 1
and t by individuals who joined the firm prior to t − 1 and by new employees who
joined the firm between t − 1 and t. Equation (3) imbeds the assumption that the
value of recent experiences of both new employees and veterans are identical from
the firm’s perspective.
Equation (3) highlights the implicit restrictions on the parameters of equation
(2) when individual level data is unavailable. Specifically, equations (2) and (4)
coincide when the human capital of exiting workers is as valuable for current production as that of current employees (i.e., λ = γ) and when new employees’ current
experience is as valuable for production as that of established workers (i.e., μ = 1).
When employee-level data is unavailable, as in Benkard (2000), Gowrisankaran,
Ho, and Town (2006), and Thompson (2007), entrants, stayers, and exitors are indistinguishable and are therefore treated as contributing equally to current production.
t
mj
t
mj
4
*
  k,t
Note that E
  ˜ t  ≠ Et in part since 
∑ j=1   ∑ k=1
  e
   = ∑ j=1   ∑ k=1
 λt−j
 ⋅e
  k,j
 
t
mj
= ∑ j=1   ∑ k=1
 γ  t−j⋅e
  k, j, where j is the exit period for individual k.

while

m

j
  k,t   

∑ j=1   ∑ k=1
  e

t
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Firm
experience

Ẽt = Et(γ = λ,  = 1)

Et (γ = 0,  < 1)

Time
Figure 1. Measures of Accumulated Firm Experience Over Time

Hence, forgetting is measured from the firm’s stock of experience in period t, and
under the following law of motion for the organization’s experience stock:
˜ t−1 + qt  .
˜ t = λ  E
(4)	 E
Figure 1 depicts the evolution of a hypothetical firm’s accumulated experience over
time. The solid line tracks the evolution of all experience ever accumulated in the
˜ t), with the underlying assumption that past experiences of individuals curfirm ( E
rently in the firm and those of individuals who left it are equally valuable to current
production (i.e., λ = γ). The dotted line tracks the aggregate human capital of the
firm’s current employees (Et) in each period t, restricting μ to 1 and the human
capital accumulated by individuals who left the firm to have zero value in current
Nt−1
 −mt
  ei,t
 ). The magnitude of the disfirm production (i.e., γ = 0, such that E
 t = ∑ i=1
crete drops in the dotted line reflects the human capital lost (instantaneously) when
workers exit. When 0 < γ < λ, the evolution of the firm’s accumulated experience
over time would fall between the solid and the dotted lines, with the magnitude of
the drops depending on γ. When μ < 1, the dotted line becomes flatter as current
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employees represent a mixture of new and seasoned workers. The gap between the
two lines would therefore increase the smaller μ and γ are.
The ability to measure the magnitude of skill decay from firm level data depends
on the extent of turnover as well as its cost to the firm. Equation (5) highlights the
effects that are confounded in equation (4) when studying skill decay, expressed in
the form of an omitted variable.5

[

t

mj

Nt

˜ t−1
k,  
(5) Et = λ  E
  + qt −    ∑   ∑  (λt−j
  − γ  t−j  )  e
 j + (1 − μ) ∑
j=1 k=1

]

 ϕi ,t .

i=Nt−1
 −mt+1

t−1
mj
  k*, j  is a component of E
  e
 ˜ t−1,
As made explicit in equation (3), the term ∑
 j=1   ∑ k=1
and is therefore highly correlated with it. Omitting this term from a regression model
will bias the coefficient on E
 ˜ t−1 (towards zero when λ > γ). The gap between the
lines in Figure 1 corresponds to the bracketed term in equation (5), which illustrates
the loss of information when only aggregate firm data are available.
_
_
Define ϕ
  t and  e t−1as the current and past experience of the average employee
at time t. When evaluating the cost of human capital depreciation between t − 1
and t, the benchmark is the case of no forgetting. Therefore, the contribution of
the average employee’s human capital depreciation to organizational forgetting is
_
 e t−1(1 − λ), where (1 − λ) is the rate of human capital depreciation. The effect of
turnover on organizational forgetting is a combination of two components; the first
is the cost to the firm of losing an experienced employee relative to retaining that
_
experience inside the firm, e t−1(λ − γ), and the second is the cost to the firm of hir_
ing a new employee relative to an experienced one, ϕ
  t(1 − μ).
The joint effect of human capital depreciation and turnover for the average employ_
_
_
ee, measured in performance terms, is e t−1(1 − γ) +  ϕt(1 − μ) = [ e t−1(1 − λ)]+ 
_
_
[ e t−1(λ − γ) +  ϕt(1 − μ)]. The relative contribution of turnover to organizational
_
_
_
_
forgetting is ( e t−1(λ − γ) +  ϕt(1 − μ))/( e t−1(1 − γ) +  ϕt(1 − μ)), while that of
_
_
_
employee human capital depreciation is e t−1(1 − λ)/( e t−1(1 − γ) +  ϕt(1 − μ)).
When μ = 1, new employees contribute as much to firm experience as established
ones, and the relative contributions of turnover and skill obsolescence to firm forgetting are constant at (λ − γ)/(1 − γ) and (1 − λ)/(1 − γ) respectively. However,
when μ differs from 1, the relative importance of each channel depends on average
current-period experience and that of exiting employees and therefore on the speed
_
of turnover within the firm. The greater the turnover rate, the lower is e t−1, and the
lesser the importance of human capital depreciation in organizational forgetting.
This confirms the intuition that human capital depreciation loses its relative importance when employment spells are short and the scope for erosion of individual
human capital is limited.

5
*     =  e
  k,j
  k, j  at the time of exit, where j
To derive the first term in the bracketed expression in (5), note that since  e
marks individual k’s date of exit, the difference between the value of exitors’ human capital retained at rate λ relaXt
Xt
t
mj
  k,* t−1 −
k,t−1
  k, j  . 
tive to rate γ is λ ∑ k=1
  e
 γ ∑ k=1
  e
  = ∑ j=1   ∑ k=1
 (λt−j
  − γ  t−j  )  e
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II. Empirical Application

We apply our framework to the universe of trauma-related ambulance runs in
Mississippi between 1991 and 2005. Trauma patients, who are involved in such
incidents as automobile accidents, injuries from falls, and criminal violence, are
stabilized, treated, and transported to definitive care by EMS providers.
Demand conditions are important in EMS. Specifically, the unpredictable nature
of emergencies and the importance of speed require ambulance units to be dispatched based on proximity and availability. This limits the firm’s ability to match
task and talent, which weakens the role of organizational capital in mitigating forgetting (Edward C. Prescott and Michael Visscher 1980).
Both human capital depreciation and turnover effects are likely to play roles in
EMS. On the one hand, the EMS provider’s performance depends on acquired skills
(e.g., closed-loop tasks), which are subject to skill decay. On the other hand, for EMS
companies, retention of paramedics is a persistent issue due to concerns regarding
personal safety, stressful working conditions, irregular hours, excessive training and
requirements, limited mobility, and low wages (Institute of Medicine Committee on
the Future of Emergency Care in the United States Health System 2007).
The medical literature provides little guidance as to the right approach for managing out-of-hospital trauma victims. Yet, conditional on the characteristics of
patients, paramedics, injury, medical interventions performed, and of the scene, and
since care provided in the field by emergency medical technicians is not definitive,
there is no dispute that a shorter out-of-hospital time is preferred to a longer one.6 In
the case where care is rendered on-scene, better diagnostic and therapeutic expertise
is essential in reducing pre-hospital intervals. In this application, we therefore identify additional experience as participation in additional ambulance runs and performance as the total out-of-hospital time for a trauma incident, which is considered a
key marker of EMS performance (Brendan G. Carr et al. 2006). The importance of
getting the patient to definitive care as soon as possible, allowing only for the performance of essential procedures, is widely accepted, as shorter out-of-hospital EMS
time intervals represent an important factor in survival (Stan Feero et al. 1995).7 As
such, contracts between municipalities and EMS organizations almost universally
specify standards for pre-hospital duration. In many cases, these are the only standards mentioned and enforced (Institute of Medicine 2007; Theodore R. Delbridge
et al. 1998).
As paramedics become more proficient in identifying faster routes, diagnosing
patient acuity, identifying the appropriate procedures, mastering protocols and techniques, and exercising better judgment in crisis situations, shorter out-of-hospital
times result. Moreover, skilled paramedics require less outside communication and
medical oversight, which in turn contribute to lowering out-of-hospital time.

Total out-of-hospital time is defined as the time (in minutes) from the moment the unit is alerted of an incident
to the moment it delivers the patient(s) to the hospital/trauma center.
7
Mississippi does not systematically collect patient discharge data, rendering it impossible to match EMS incidents to mortality or other patient health outcomes.
6
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We develop models linking the human capital accumulated by paramedics to outof-hospital time. The input of interest is the human capital of paramedics, as measured by their recent and past experiences as of the date of the incident.
Formally, consider a trauma scene at date t in which injured patient k requires
some pre-hospital intervention(s) by paramedic i. Out-of-hospital time may be written as
(6)

 Wit + φt + ηi + εikt
   ,
lnOHTikt = βe  ln eit + βXXkt  + βW

 is
where OHTiktis the out-of-hospital time for patient k attended by paramedic i. ei,t
paramedic i’s experience as of date t. Xkt capture the characteristics of the patient,
such as her age, sex, race, and all interactions of injury type and injured body part.
It also captures characteristics of the incident, such as type and location of trauma.
In addition to paramedic experience, W
 it includes paramedic characteristics, such
as their certification levels, the certification level and experience of the driver that
is paired with them, the team’s joint experience, and the type of firm they work for.
φtis a vector of indicators for hour of day, day of the week, month and year. η i are
individual paramedic fixed effects and ε ikt is a random disturbance. The parameter
βemeasures the degree of paramedic learning.
The law of motion in (1) calls for estimating equation (6) by nonlinear least
squares according to the following specification:
(7)

 Wit + φt + ηi + εikt.
ln OHTikt = βe  ln (λ ei,t−1 + ϕi,t) + βXXkt + βW

Our measure of recent paramedic experience, ϕ, accumulates experience over running 3-month windows, recording paramedic volume at a given date as the number
of trauma runs accumulated during the prior 91 days.8 This measure is more precise
than fixed calendar quarters, used extensively in the learning literature applied to
health care providers, as it responds instantaneously to any changes in the recent
experience profile.9 We construct similar measures of experience for drivers and
driver-paramedic pairs.
Individual paramedic fixed effects are introduced to mitigate concerns that the
relationship between experience and performance observed in the cross-section is
driven by composition effects. For example, low quality paramedics might participate in fewer runs whereas more able paramedics may accumulate more experience
by working more intensely and/or staying in the profession longer. Paramedic fixed
effects therefore ensure that the experience parameters in (7) are identified from
improvements in performance within paramedic.

8

For each incident, we look back 91 days, tallying the number of trauma incidents attended by the paramedic
sent to a particular scene (ϕi,t
 ). Similarly, we count the trauma incidents attended in the 91-day window starting
182 days ago (ϕi,t−1), then 273 days ago (ϕi,t−2), then 364 days ago (ϕi,t−3), and so on. The parameter λ should
therefore be interpreted as quarterly retention rate. While the definition of time interval over which to accumulate
volume is somewhat arbitrary, three-month windows turn out to be computationally convenient given the size of the
dataset used in our application. Shrinking the size of the look-back window would add to the computational burden.
9
Experience accumulation with moving windows can be viewed as smoothing the calendar quarter step function
and alleviating the imprecision which increases the further incidents are from the beginning of the quarter.
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The study of human capital accumulation among paramedics is particularly well
suited for studying learning and forgetting as the unpredictable nature of emergencies does not lend itself to the type of selection on unobserved quality that exists
whenever the choice of producers is driven by the quality of their products or services. Ambulance units are dispatched based on proximity and not on reputation,
and trauma victims do not choose the providers of emergency pre-hospital care.10
Specifically, conditional on observables and on fixed effects, ε iktis unlikely to be
related to paramedic characteristics, be they quality, ability or, importantly, experience as selection on such unobservables is unlikely to occur given the current design
of the EMS system. This is a major benefit of studying learning and forgetting in the
context of emergency medical services, and as a result, the parameters in (7) can be
consistently estimated by (nonlinear) least squares.
In turn, organizational forgetting is estimated using the definition of firm experience in (4), which corresponds to the case where individual data are not available.
(8)

˜
qt) + βXXkt + φt + εkt  .
ln OHTkt = βE
˜   ln (λE
 
 ˜   Et−1 + 

Our measure of recent firm experience, qt, accumulates trauma incidents served by
the responding firm over the 91 days preceding each incident. Thus, we ignore the
detail in our data about which paramedic and driver were sent to which scene, and
aggregate the firm’s quarterly volume over the set of paramedics it employs, counting each incident as one experience.
Following Thompson (2007), in equation (8) we estimate including and excluding hiring and separation rates. Additional information on hiring and separation
rates creates an intermediate case between having no ability to track individuals and
having an individual-level panel, as it tracks turnover-related dynamics in addition
to firm-level experience accumulation.11 The measure of firm experience, represented by the solid line in Figure 1, ignores any information on individual providers
and therefore excludes time varying paramedic characteristics such as certification
level and experience as well as paramedic fixed effects.
Finally, we estimate organizational forgetting using the definition of firm experience in (5). For comparability, we use the same set of controls as in (8).

(

[

t

mj

t−j
˜ t−1 + qt −  ∑   ∑  (λ  t−j
  k,j   
)  e
(9)  ln OHTkt = βE  ln  λE  E
E   − γ 
j=1 k=1
Nt

+ (1 − μ)  ∑

])

 ϕi ,t   + βXXkt  + φt + εkt  .

i=Nt−1−mt+1

In equation (9), we exploit the unique paramedic identifiers in our data to define
hiring and separation dates using each paramedic’s first and last ambulance run,
10
While in Table 4 we provide evidence in support of random assignment, matching scene acuity to paramedic
experience will lead to conservative estimates of the effect of experience on performance, as it will bias our results
towards zero.
11
Technically, even if data on exit dates of employees were available, introducing dummies to mark the date of
t−1
mj
k, j is time varying by virtue of human capital depreciation.
an employee’s exit will not recover λE, as ∑
 j=1 ∑ k=1
  e
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respectively. Using these definitions, we construct measures that track the experience of paramedics in their first quarter on the job, and record that of paramedics no
longer in the firm as of the date of their exit.
The variation originating from the drops in the dotted line (in Figure 1) allows
us to disentangle γ from λE. It is important to note that the coefficient estimate of
organizational forgetting, λE
 ˜ , obtained from estimating equation (8) is a weighted
average of λE s and γs as the overall effect of organizational forgetting depends on
both the rate of turnover and the magnitude of human capital lost to it.
III. Data

Our data were obtained from the Office of Emergency Planning and Response
at the Mississippi Department of Health. Since 1991, this office has systematically
collected incident-level EMS data through the Mississippi Emergency Medical
Services Information System (MEMSIS). The raw data are recorded at the individual patient level by local EMS providers.
We limit our attention to emergency incidents for which the initial call was related
to trauma (defined as motor vehicle crashes, motorcycle crashes, pedestrian injuries,
stabbings, assaults, gunshots, or falls).12 To focus on EMS runs where time to definitive care is most likely to be important, we exclude cases of death on arrival and
limit the sample to calls involving at least one patient injury and ending in transport
to hospitals by ground transportation.13
Detailed data on medical interventions and procedures are available only for the
2001–2005 period. While we restrict our analysis to this latter period, we use data for
all years (1991–2005) to construct the history of paramedics’ experiences, encompassing approximately 613,000 trauma runs. Our data allows us to follow 1,740
uncensored paramedics (85 percent of paramedics in our data) from their entry into
the profession and construct measures of their tenure and cumulative experience.
The final sample includes approximately 177,000 observations (or 146,000 observations, excluding censored paramedics).
With the Emergency Medical Services Systems Act of 1973, Congress delegated the
responsibility for overseeing EMS provision, financing, and organization to municipalities (Delbridge et al. 1998). Local governments can provide these services in-house,
usually through their fire department or, alternatively, contract with local hospital-based
or other ambulance companies (David and Arthur J. Chiang 2009). Mississippi encompasses 86 contracting municipalities (82 counties and four cities). Each contracting
area corresponds to a single EMS provider, with some serving multiple contracting
areas.14 We control for the type of agency providing EMS in our analysis.
12
Given the highly skewed nature of reported interval times, and the possibility of extreme values due to miscoding, we exclude calls for which either the reported time from dispatch to arrival on the scene or the reported time
from leaving the scene to arrival to a hospital exceeds 60 minutes. This criterion excluded less than one percent of
trauma observations.
13
A number of companies in Mississippi provide air ambulance services. We exclude less than 400 such observations, in which helicopters and fixed wings were dispatched. Therefore, all runs in our data involve ground
transportation.
14
All contracting municipalities in Mississippi operate on sole provider agreements, which assign a single
advanced life support (ALS) provider to each contracting municipality. The local ALS provider (the “firm” in our
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Local and national guidelines require advanced life support teams responding to
trauma calls to be composed, at a minimum, of one driver and one paramedic (EMTP).15 Paramedics can engage in advanced airway management, cardiac monitoring,
drug therapy and/or advanced techniques that exceed the level provided by technicians with lower certification levels. Team composition may therefore affect total
out-of-hospital time through the quantity and complexity of procedures performed
on scene. In addition to the experience of the paramedic, we control for the driver’s
experience and certification level as well as for the experience accumulated jointly
by the paramedic-driver pair (i.e., the team).
To proxy for the underlying severity, we control for the number and types of procedures, the type of trauma and patient characteristics. In addition, our data include
detailed information on the injured body part (i.e., arm, leg, chest, hip, back, neck,
head, face, abdomen, and eye) and the type of injury (i.e., pain, burn, laceration,
soft tissue, blunt, fracture or dislocation, penetrating trauma, and amputation). We
control for all possible combinations of these indicators, as they are likely to be
correlated with the severity of the injury which, in turn, is likely to be an important
determinant of total out-of-hospital time.
While we are interested in the effect of firm experience on total out-of-hospital
time, there are many other factors that may affect this marker of performance. These
confounders, presented in Table 1, include the type of trauma, the incident location,
patient characteristics, the number and types of procedures performed, the month
and year, the certification level of the EMTs, the company that employs them, the
municipality they operate in, and the number of victims.16
The timing of the call may affect total out-of-hospital time as well. Weather conditions, varying by season, may also affect the time needed to reach, access, stabilize, and transport patients. Potential lack of artificial lighting and fatigue, especially
at night, could affect the speed of operation at the scene. Therefore, in our analysis,
we control for year, month, day of week, and hour of the day.
IV. Results

In this section, we begin by presenting estimates of organizational forgetting,
turnover effects and human capital depreciation in EMS at the firm level. We then
present analyses of potential mechanisms leading to skill decay at the individual
paramedic level.

analysis) may compete with other firms for the exclusive contract, yet faces no competition in dispatching once
they secure the contract.
15
The three national standard levels of training for Emergency Medical Technicians (EMT) are: EMT-Basic
(EMT-B), EMT-Intermediate (EMT-I), and EMT-Paramedic (EMT-P). The US Department of Transportation
(DOT) provided the basis for the education of EMTs and Paramedics. In addition, Mississippi requires operators
of ambulance vehicles to be EMT-Driver certified (EMT-D), by participating in a training program in operation of
emergency vehicles.
16
Approximately 75 percent of trauma incidents involved a single patient and 98 percent involved at most three
individuals.
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Table 1—Summary Statistics
Variable
Out-of-hospital time
Paramedic number of runs in last 3 months
Firm number of runs in last 3 months
Paramedic total number of runs (uncensored)
Paramedic-driver pair total number of runs
Number of procedures
Number of EMS procedures in incident

Mean
36.05
18.02
458.91
409.37
27.81
1.99

minutes
trauma runs
trauma runs
trauma runs
trauma runs
procedures

SD
16.62
12.35
530.69
298.96
57.11
2.19

Demographics and people in incident
Patient age
Patient race: African American
Patient race: white
Patient gender: female
Number of victims in incident

42.12
years
40.67%
56.00%
55.08%
1.33
victims

EMS times and trauma characteristics
Type of trauma: fall
Type of trauma: motor vehicle crash
Type of trauma: motorcycle accident
Type of trauma: pedestrian accident
Type of trauma: cut/stabbing
Type of trauma: assault
Type of trauma: gunshot

31.49%
53.00%
1.15%
1.69%
2.34%
8.83%
1.51%

0.464
0.499
0.106
0.129
0.151
0.284
0.122

Location of trauma: city street
Location of trauma: county road
Location of trauma: state/federal highway
Location of trauma: residence
Location of trauma: other

20.66%
9.33%
23.69%
30.53%
15.80%

0.405
0.291
0.425
0.461
0.365

Year, month, day of week, hour of the day
Year 2001
Year 2002
Year 2003
Year 2004
Year 2005

19.61%
21.55%
19.66%
19.75%
19.43%

0.397
0.411
0.397
0.398
0.396

7.54%
7.78%
8.76%
8.79%
9.15%
8.54%
8.78%
7.90%
7.99%
8.20%
8.33%
8.24%

0.264
0.268
0.283
0.283
0.288
0.279
0.283
0.270
0.271
0.274
0.276
0.275

2.55%
0.57%
96.12%

0.158
0.075
0.193

January
February
March
April
May
June
July
August
September
October
November
December
Certification levels
Cerification level: EMT-Basic
Cerification level: EMT-Intermediate
Cerification level: EMT-Paramedics

25.10
0.491
0.496
0.497
0.743
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Table 2—Determinants of Organizational Forgetting with Hiring and Separation Rates
Pre-Hospital Trauma Incidents, Mississippi 2001–2005

Dependent variable:
Log(total out-of-hospital time)
Cross-section
Contract-area
fixed effects
Reduced form
organizational
Cross-section
forgetting
(Eq. (8) with
hiring &
separation
rates)
Contract-area
fixed effects

Model I

λ˜E  

0.6946
[0.00478]***

λ˜E  

0.6700
[0.00713]***

0.6805
[0.00748]***

0.6959
[0.00719]***

0.6934
[0.00465]***

0.6893
[0.00461]***

λ˜E  
Separation
Hiring

λ˜E  
Separation

0.7089
[0.00268]***
0.2640
[0.02064]***

0.3793
[0.0183]***

0.7523
[0.00282]***

−0.0188
[0.01961]

Hiring

0.0687
[0.01767]***

λ˜E 

0.6807
[0.00769]***

μ

λ˜E  

γ

μ

0.4906
[0.00451]***

0.4596
[0.25649]*

0.7010
[0.00555]***
0.2983
[0.02035]***

0.3126
[0.01809]***

0.7079
[0.00644]***

−0.0169
[0.01893]
0.0154
[0.01711]

0.6915
[0.0079]***

0.4155
[0.02353]***

0.2471
[0.14136]*

0.7130
[0.00499]***
0.3096
[0.02025]***

0.3112
[0.01803]***

0.7055
[0.00559]***

−0.0234
[0.01875]
0.0240
[0.01694]

0.7176
[0.00764]***

0.4526
[0.01391]***

0.3841
[0.02516]***

0.3630
[0.00657]***

0.3687
[0.07357]***

139,651
X

1.3273
[0.40484]***

0.7810
[0.00344]***

1.5867
[0.35761]***

0.3009
[0.0198]***

0.7707
[0.02705]***

1.3373
[1.67305]

139,651

139,651

X

X

Demographics and
people in incident

X

X

X

Trauma characteristics

X

X

0.0681
[0.01764]***

0.0139
[0.0171]

−0.0206
[0.0188]

0.2881
[0.01968]***

X

Year, month, day of week, hour

139,651

0.3135
[0.02037]***

139,651

Observations
Number of procedures

−0.0154
[0.01897]

0.4664
[0.00523]***

0.6533
[0.00384]***

−0.0120
[0.01839]

Hiring

−0.0184
[0.01964]

0.6882
[0.00455]***

0.0212
[0.01649]

0.3021
[0.01755]***

0.8012
[0.00463]***

1.7901
[0.47801]***

0.0288
[0.0165]*

−0.0093
[0.01835]

0.3166
[0.01752]***

0.7575
[0.00552]***

1.7565
[0.17636]***

−0.0150
[0.01814]

0.6990
[0.03443]***

0.3138
[0.01798]***

0.7585
[0.00202]***

0.4456
[0.01086]***

0.7028
[0.00485]***

0.3045
[0.01761]***

5.9486
[0.51753]***

0.3068
[0.02027]***

0.4984
[0.00136]***

0.3134
[0.01757]***

0.3058
[0.01983]***

1.4657
[0.25987]***

0.2958
[0.02038]***

0.3156
[0.01802]***

0.2921
[0.01968]***

0.6995
[0.02679]***

0.6358
[0.27885]**

0.2616
[0.02068]***

0.3818
[0.01826]***

0.7109
[0.00444]***

−0.0118
[0.01819]

Separation

Controls

Model V

0.6933
[0.0047]***

Hiring

Contract-area
fixed effects

Model IV

0.6911
[0.00718]***

Separation
Firm turnover
and skill decay
(Eq. (9) with
hiring &
separation
rates)

Model III

0.6908
[0.00801]***

γ
Cross-section

Model II

0.6970
[0.00822]***

0.0216
[0.01694]

0.0260
[0.0165]

0.0218
[0.01651]

X

Notes: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in brackets below the estimated coefficients. Significance levels for
estimates of μ are for tests against the null of μ = 1 (i.e. new and seasoned paramedics make equal contributions to firm recent experience). Patient demographics include indicators for race, gender, and 12 age categories. Trauma characteristics include the type of
trauma, location of incidents, and injury characteristics. The types of trauma are falls, gunshot wounds, cuts or stabbings, assaults,
motor vehicle crashes, and motorcycle and pedestrian accidents. Locations of incidents include residences, city streets, county
roads, and state or federal highways. Injury characteristics include 70 interactions of injured body part and injury type.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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A. Firm-Level Analysis
We estimate equations (8) and (9), first with no controls (Model I), then successively add possible confounders, as discussed in the previous section.17 All models are estimated by nonlinear least squares with heteroskedasticity-robust standard
errors.
Table 2 reports estimates of organizational forgetting for the full sample, first
cross-sectionally, then with contract-area fixed effects to account for unobserved
differences in geography and severity across areas.18 The upper panel reports estimates based on equation (8), which represents a reduced form of organizational
forgetting, as it ignores the distinction between human capital depreciation and turnover effects. The estimates suggest that about a quarter of the stock of experience
existing at the beginning of the year survives to the end of the year (0.699 4). When
forgetting is identified only from changes over time within contract-area, the measure of forgetting is stable and tightly estimated, with 70 percent of a firm’s experience being carried over from a quarter ago to today’s performance.
Due to data limitations, previous studies of organizational forgetting could only
address turnover effects by adding hiring and separation rates as regressors (Argote
1999; Thompson 2007). This approach is valid and useful for eliciting organizational forgetting net of turnover effects under certain limiting scenarios. These
include cases where there is no learning; there is learning but none of it is lost
(i.e., the human capital accumulated by those leaving the firm stays with the firm);
or human capital is lost due to exit, but is perfectly predicted by turnover rates.
Nevertheless, it is unlikely that separation rates embody all information regarding
the human capital accumulated by those leaving the firm. For instance, consider two
identical firms, one which replaces a highly experienced paramedic while the other
replaces a relatively inexperienced one. Both firms will record the same turnover
rate yet may differ in their production experience.
To test this empirically, the middle panel of Table 2 includes hiring and separation rates as regressors. In the cross section, hiring and separation rates have
large adverse and significant effects on performance. However, when controlling
for unobserved contract-area characteristics, these effects disappear. One possible
explanation is that the magnitude of hiring and separation rates reflect the size of
firms, with observed turnover rates decreasing in firm size. In our application, small
firms are common in rural areas, in which total out-of-hospital times are inherently
longer.
The lower panel of Table 2 reports estimates based on equation (9), in which firm
experience is separated into human capital accrued by individuals still in the firm and
by those who left the firm. We discuss the estimates of skill decay (1 − λE) and turnover effect (λE − γ) from the most saturated model (Model V) with contract-area
17
Sample size is slightly decreasing across models due to missing information on EMT certification levels and
time stamps totaling less than 850 observations and resulting in approximately 174,000 in Model VI for the full
sample.
18
Note that since equations (8) and (9) mimic the case in which data on paramedics are missing, it makes little
sense to estimate models that include indicators for individual paramedics.
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fixed effects. We find the turnover effect to be roughly twice as large as the effect of
human capital depreciation (0.402 compared with 0.229).
As indicated by our framework, the reduced form coefficient estimate of organizational forgetting estimated from equation (8) and reported in the upper panel of
Table 2 (0.699) is a weighted average of λ
 E  (0.771) and γ (0.369) from the lower
panel.
In turn, the estimate of μ in equation (9) is unstable and imprecisely estimated
across specifications. Model V with contract area fixed effects suggests that the
hypothesis that a new paramedic is comparable to a seasoned one in terms of performance cannot be rejected. While this null (i.e., μ = 1) implies that new and seasoned paramedics make equal contributions to firm recent experience, it does not
imply that replacing an experienced paramedic by a new one is costless since a frac_
tion (λ − γ) of the former’s past human capital, e t−1, would be lost entirely during
replacement.
_
_
_
_
  t(1 − μ) + e t−1(λE  − γ))/(ϕ
  t(1 − μ) + e t−1(1 − γ)) is a
Put together, (ϕ
measure of the relative importance of the cost of turnover. Assuming the average
_
paramedic in our sample is replaced by one with no experience (i.e.,  ϕt  ≅ 18.02
_
and  e t−1  ≅ 209.44) we find that about 62 percent of organizational forgetting is
attributable to turnover.19
Adding hiring and separation rates to equation (9) has no effect on the estimates of
λE, γ, and μ. This suggests that hiring and separation rates provide inadequate information in our application, as they are correlated neither with the recent experience of
entrants nor with the value of human capital of employees no longer with the firm.
B. Individual-Level Analysis
In our application, we find both human capital depreciation and turnover effects
to be important channels through which organizational forgetting comes to bear.
The detail of our data, which tracks individual employee activity, allows us to further investigate mechanisms that may be responsible for individual skill decay by
considering specifications that attribute performance entirely to paramedic-driver
teams. More specifically, our data follows paramedics over 15 years. For 85 percent
of paramedics, we observe their entry into the profession and onwards, and can
therefore study learning and forgetting within individuals. For each incident, we
control for time varying paramedic characteristics such as changes to their certification-level as well as the experience and certification-level of the driver with which
they are paired. Note that individual level data is not sufficient for studying individual skill decay. One needs an application that allows for attributing performance to
individuals.20 In EMS, out-of-hospital time is produced by paramedic-driver pairs.
Therefore, in addition to controlling for the driver characteristics, we control for the
joint experience of each paramedic-driver pair.
_

19
 e t−1 = f (λE ) is calculated assuming λE= 0.771 (as estimated in the most saturated contract area fixed effects
specification in Table 2) for the uncensored paramedics sample.
20
The inability to attribute performance to individuals poses a measurement challenge in large scale manufacturing, where production often requires joint assembly and coordination. In this regard, the applicability of the
individual-level analysis, outside of the service industry, may be limited.
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Table 3— Random Assignment Regressions with Paramedic Fixed Effects
Patient characteristics
Age indicators
Dependent variable:

5–14

14–18

18–25

25–35

35–45

45–55

55–65

65–75

0.001
[0.001]

−0.001
[0.002]

−0.001
[0.002]

0.002
[0.002]

0.001
[0.002]

−0.003
[0.002]

0.0004
[0.002]

−0.001
[0.002]

Log cumulative volume
(excl. left-censored
paramedics)

−0.002
[0.002]

0.002
[0.003]

0.002
[0.004]

0.002
[0.004]

0.005
[0.004]

0.0005
[0.003]

−0.001
[0.003]

−0.0004
[0.002]

Log cumulative volume
(incl. left-censored
paramedics)

−0.001
[0.002]

0.001
[0.003]

0.002
[0.004]

0.002
[0.003]

0.005
[0.004]

0.00005
[0.003]

−0.0004
[0.003]

−0.001
[0.002]

Log quarterly volume
(91 days)

Patient characteristics (cont.)

Dependent variable:

Age (cont.)
75–85

White

0.0004
[0.002]

0.006
[0.003]*

0.004
[0.003]

0.002
[0.013]

Log cumulative volume
(excl. left-censored
paramedics)

−0.005
[0.003]*

0.007
[0.006]

0.001
[0.004]

0.001
[0.024]

−0.007
[0.006]

−0.005
[0.004]

−0.004
[0.006]

0.016
[0.007]**

Log cumulative volume
(incl. left-censored
paramedics)

−0.005
[0.003]*

0.008
[0.006]

0.001
[0.004]

−0.006
[0.023]

−0.007
[0.006]

−0.006
[0.004]*

−0.003
[0.006]

0.016
[0.007]**

Log quarterly volume
(91 days)

Female

Scene characteristics
Number of
injuries

Street

Road

0.008
−0.005
[0.003]** [0.002]**

Scene characteristics (cont.)
Dependent variable:

Gunshot

Fall

Motorcycle Pedestrian

Cut/stab

Highway

MVC

0.005
[0.003]*

−0.012
[0.002]***

Hour indicators
Assault

18–20

21–23

0.005
−0.001
[0.002]*** [0.003]

0.0004
[0.003]

−0.001
[0.001]

0.006
0.001
[0.002]*** [0.001]

0.001
[0.001]

−0.0004
[0.001]

Log cumulative volume
(excl. left-censored
paramedics)

0.001
[0.001]

−0.013
−0.0001
[0.005]** [0.001]

−0.0004
[0.001]

−0.002
[0.002]

−0.002
[0.003]

0.004
[0.005]

−0.005
[0.005]

Log cumulative volume
(incl. left-censored
paramedics)

0.001
[0.001]

0.0001
−0.014
[0.005]*** [0.001]

0.0001
[0.001]

−0.002
[0.002]

−0.002
[0.003]

0.002
[0.005]

−0.007
[0.005]

Log quarterly volume
(91 days)

Notes: Paramedic fixed effects are included in all models since subsequent learning/forgetting models are estimated
with fixed effects; and to allow for the possibility of paramedic sorting across time and across the firm’s coverage
areas in a manner that matches their ability to the expected severity of scenes. Standard errors are reported in brackets below the estimated coefficients, and are clustered at the paramedic level.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.

Consistent estimation by nonlinear least squares of individual skill decay models relies on random assignment of paramedics to scenes. In particular, it requires
unobserved patient and scene characteristics to be unrelated to paramedic experience conditional on paramedic fixed effects. Table 3 reports estimates of models in
which incident characteristics are regressed on paramedic experience, controlling
for paramedic fixed effects. The results indicate that paramedic experience is unrelated to most observable patient and scene characteristics, providing some validation for our research design. In the few instances in which experience has some
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statistical significance, the magnitudes of the coefficients are extremely small.21
This is not surprising, as the unpredictable nature of emergencies and the importance of total out-of-hospital time require ambulance units to be dispatched based
solely on proximity.
To control for potential heterogeneity in productivity, we estimated specifications
with paramedic fixed effects. These capture any time-invariant factors that affect
individual performance and may be related to experience. For example, firms may
require their most able paramedics to be on call during times when and/or locations
where the volume and severity of trauma are expected to be high. This type of sorting is absorbed into the fixed effect.22
The individual skill decay models are presented in Table 4, which reports estimates of individual learning, βe, and skill retention, λ, based on equation (7).23
Individual skill decay measured at the paramedic level is comparable in magnitude
to the estimates from the firm analysis, presented in Table 2. The upper panel reports
the results for the full sample including all paramedics, and the lower panel reports
results for the subsample that excludes paramedics who appeared in the data in
1991, and are therefore potentially left-censored.24 Each panel contrasts estimates
from cross-sectional, contract-area fixed effects, and paramedic fixed effects specifications, with successively more incident characteristics being controlled for moving
from Model I to VI. As mentioned above, paramedic experience profiles are calculated on a rolling-quarters basis such that, for instance, φi,tis the number of runs in
which paramedic i was involved over the 91-day period ending at date t. Standard
errors are clustered at the paramedic level to allow for correlation in out-of-hospital
times across incidents within the same paramedic.
The similar magnitudes in the upper and lower panels suggest that the problem
of censored regressors, studied by Roberto Rigobon and Thomas M. Stoker (2009),
does not appear to be severe in this context. Given the estimated magnitude of quarterly individual forgetting, this similarity most probably stems from the irrelevance
of experiences accumulated prior to 1991 to performance after the beginning of our
sample, in 2001. Focusing on the uncensored sample and the paramedic fixed effects
specifications, the estimates of βe are relatively insensitive to the set of controls
and imply statistically significant learning on the part of paramedics. All else constant, a 50 percent increase in paramedic experience is associated with roughly 40
seconds shorter total-out-of-hospital duration. Finally, Table 5 indicates that there
is a consistent and statistically significant degree of skill decay, and is larger in
magnitude than the aggregate skill decay reported in Table 2. While both equations
(7) and (9) produce strong evidence of skill decay, the discrepancy in magnitudes
21
The largest effect is for the incidents of motor vehicle crashes (MVC), where a 1 percent increase in cumulative experience is associated with a 0.00016 percentage point increase in the likelihood being dispatched to a MVC
scene.
22
Bias may result from evolutionary forces such as learning about match quality, which has implications for
separation decisions. To test for potential attrition bias, we perform a version of the Marno Verbeek and Theo
Nijman (1992) variable addition test described in Jeffrey M. Wooldridge (2002) in which leads and lags of selection indicators are added as regressors. This approach is attractive in this context since it is implementable in a fixed
effects specification. We find no evidence of attrition bias.
23
Note that individual forgetting is 1 − λ.
24
Note that the full sample was used for the firm analysis (Tables 2 and 3), as censoring would not be possible
to infer absent individual identifiers.
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Table 4—Paramedic-Level Learning and Forgetting
Pre-Hospital Trauma Incidents, Mississippi 2001–2005
Dependent variable:
Log(total out-of-hospital time)

Model I

Model II

Model III

Model IV

Model V

Model VI

−0.02986
−0.02787
−0.00156
−0.00271
[0.00678]*** [0.00676]*** [0.00063]** [0.00183]

−0.00530
[0.00368]

Including left-censored paramedics

Cross-section

Contract-area
fixed effects

Paramedic
fixed effects
Observations

Learning (βe)
Retention (λ)
Learning (βe)
Retention (λ)
Learning (βe)

−0.00924
[0.00541]*
1.74084
[0.98028]*

0.55551
0.55610
140.90450
[0.09076]*** [0.09429]***[188.2986]

14.10342
[25.81297]

3.92207
[4.75924]

−0.02856
−0.02877
−0.02862
−0.02778
−0.02612
−0.02669
[0.00381]*** [0.00379]*** [0.00372]*** [0.00364]*** [0.00368]*** [0.00376]***
0.69670
0.58178
0.58155
0.59285
0.60616
0.60837
[0.04093]*** [0.04857]*** [0.04752]*** [0.04611]*** [0.04828]*** [0.04739]***

−0.02784
−0.02925
−0.02867
−0.02447
−0.03437
−0.03539
[0.00662]*** [0.00642]*** [0.00632]*** [0.00635]*** [0.00877]*** [0.0088]***
0.49701
0.48027
0.47164
[0.10903]*** [0.10528]*** [0.1092]***

Retention (λ)

Number of clusters

177,455

177,455

177,455

2,044

2,044

2,044

0.49441
0.69686
[0.12045]*** [0.0789]***
177,455

177,455

2,044

2,044

0.70002
[0.07677]***
176,508
2,022

Excluding left-censored paramedics

Cross-section

Contract-area
fixed effects

Paramedic
fixed effects
Observations

Learning (βe)
Retention (λ)
Learning (βe)
Retention (λ)
Learning (βe)

−0.01020
[0.00646]

1.56288
[0.81404]*

Number of procedures
Demographics and people in incident
Year, month, day of week, hour
Certification level

8.76735
[16.89843]

2.67375
[2.64565]

0.72453
0.61603
0.61440
0.62318
0.64005
0.63925
[0.04175]*** [0.04602]*** [0.04486]*** [0.04364]*** [0.04505]*** [0.04455]***

−0.02963
−0.03065
−0.03025
−0.02624
−0.03617
−0.03727
[0.00694]*** [0.00676]*** [0.0066]*** [0.00657]*** [0.00877]*** [0.00876]***

Retention (λ)

Trauma characteristics

0.58284
0.56785
1171.24900
[0.08794]*** [0.09379]***[1261.453]

−0.00637
[0.00468]

−0.03088
−0.03153
−0.03146
−0.03098
−0.02971
−0.03026
[0.00415]*** [0.00415]*** [0.00408]*** [0.00402]*** [0.00406]*** [0.00414]***

Number of clusters

Controls

−0.03354
−0.03157
−0.00114
−0.00291
[0.00725]*** [0.00718]*** [0.00038]*** [0.00242]

0.51765
0.49851
0.49030
[0.10731]*** [0.10814]*** [0.1101]***
146,969

146,969

146,969

1,738

1,738

1,738

X

0.51431
[0.1197]***
146,969
1,738

0.71150
0.71269
[0.07867]*** [0.07605]***
146,969

146,185

1,738

1,718

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X
X

Notes: All models control for driver and paramedic-driver pair experiences. Patient demographics include indicators for race, gender, and 12 age categories. Trauma characteristics include the type of trauma, location of incidents, and injury characteristics. The types of trauma are falls, gunshot wounds, cuts or stabbings, assaults, motor
vehicle crashes, and motorcycle and pedestrian accidents. Locations of incidents include residences, city streets,
county roads, and state or federal highways. Injury characteristics include 70 interactions of injured body part and
injury type. Standard errors are reported in brackets below the estimated coefficients, and are clustered at the paramedic level.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.

of human capital retention may be driven by differences in volatility of the two
measures of experience. Paramedic-level experience profiles are more volatile than
their firm’s experience profile, which tracks the demand for emergency trauma care,
and are therefore more likely to generate lower (and less tightly estimated) retention
coefficients.
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Table 5—Mechanisms for Skill Decay and Falsification Test
Pre-Hospital Trauma Incidents, Mississippi 2001–2005

Dependent variable:
Log(total out-of-hospital time)

Learning (βe)

Retention (λ)

Specifications with periods of inactivity
Model I

Model II

Model III

Model IV

Model V

Model VI

−0.03564
−0.03551
−0.03438
−0.02970
−0.04284
−0.04322
[0.00862]*** [0.00835]*** [0.00805]*** [0.00796]*** [0.01083]*** [0.01083]***

Days since
last run

0.55049
0.52433
[0.10319]*** [0.1074]***

0.50996
0.52801
0.73962
0.73974
[0.11228]*** [0.12382]*** [0.07806]*** [0.07781]***

0.00072
0.00072
0.00068
[0.00021]*** [0.00021]*** [0.0002]***

0.00061
0.00069
0.00069
[0.00019]*** [0.00019]*** [0.00019]***

Observations

146,012

146,012

146,012

146,012

146,012

145,248

1,657

1,657

1,657

1,657

1,657

1,644

Number of clusters

Specifications including experience with medical incidents
Log(total out-of-hospital time)

Learning (βe)

Retention (λ)
Learning (βeM)

Model I
−0.01892
[0.01272]

0.48310
[0.26701]*

−0.01105
[0.01218]

Model II

Model III

Model IV

Model V

−0.04548
−0.04457
−0.03837
−0.04335
[0.01594]*** [0.01551]*** [0.01498]** [0.0195]**

Model VI
−0.02927
[0.00886]***

0.61104
0.60049
0.61268
0.72616
0.64383
[0.08771]*** [0.08835]*** [0.10046]*** [0.12479]*** [0.10711]***
−0.00129
[0.00191]

0.02396750
[0.0160294]

0.02536
[0.01593]

0.020915
[0.01526]

0.00936
[0.01867]

146,970

146,970

146,970

146,970

146,970

146,191

Number of clusters

1,738

1,738

1,738

1,738

1,738

1,718

Log(time alerted)

Model I

Model II

Model III

Model IV

Model V

Model VI

−0.001575
[0.00527]

−0.001543
[0.00454]

−0.001641
[0.00386]

−0.001978
[0.00314]

−0.003000
[0.00337]

−0.003692
[0.00509]

Retention (λM)
Observations

0.48929
[0.38699]

0.85149
0.87804
0.90076
0.75880
[0.14122]*** [0.14152]*** [0.17695]*** [0.52887]

34.44258
[157.4546]

Falsification test
Learning (βe)

Forgetting (λ)
Observations

0.00000
[0.00001]

0.00070
[0.00776]

0.00004
[0.0004]

0.00006
[0.00027]

0.00005
[0.00025]

0.00113
[0.00825]

147,061

147,061

147,061

146,993

146,993

146,209

1,741

1,741

1,741

1,740

1,740

1,720

Number of clusters
Controls
Number of procedures
Demographics and people in incident
Trauma characteristics
Year, month, day of week, hour
Certification level

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X
X

Notes: All models are estimated with paramedic fixed effects, exclude left-censored paramedics, and control for
driver and paramedic-driver pair experiences. Patient demographics include indicators for race, gender, and 12 age
categories. Trauma characeristics include the type of trauma, location of incidents, and injury characteristics. The
types of trauma are falls, gunshot wounds, cuts or stabbings, assaults, motor vehicle crashes, and motorcycle and
pedestrian accidents. Locations of incidents include residences, city streets, county roads, and state or federal highways. Injury characteristics include 70 interactions of injured body part and injury type. Standard errors are reported
in brackets below the estimated coefficients, and are clustered at the paramedic level.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.

In all of our specifications, it is important to note that even if our controls for interventions on scene, injury profile, trauma characteristics, and patient demographics
reflect severity only to a limited extent, concerns regarding omitted variables are not
likely to be important given the current EMS system design. It is difficult to argue

Vol. 3 No. 3

David and Brachet: Determinants of Organizational Forgetting

119

for a correlation between severity and experience, due to the fact that dispatching
is determined by proximity to the scene and not by paramedic reputation. However,
even if dispatch matched paramedic experience with patient severity, it is unlikely
that indications of higher acuity would result in the dispatching of the least experienced crews, which is the only mechanism that would account for our results. If
there is matching between paramedic experience and patient severity, our coefficient
estimates of βe underestimate the true degree of learning.
While our regressions control for the count of procedures performed on-scene,
one might worry about selection on the complexity of procedures performed by
paramedics. For example, if inexperienced paramedics choose simpler procedures, which require relatively fewer minutes, we might infer that less experience
results in shorter on-scene times conditional on the number of procedures. This
would lead us to underestimate the magnitude of the experience premium. To
address this concern, we replaced the procedure counts with a set of 33 procedures
indicators. Our results are insensitive to this replacement and, for brevity, are not
reported here.
As individual skill decay accounts for approximately 38 percent of organizational
forgetting in EMS, it is important to better understand how individual paramedic
forgetting may come to bear. We test two potential mechanisms for skill decay: production breaks through periods of inactivity and interference through a wider set of
tasks; in our application, the performance of non-trauma (medical) tasks.
We extend the analysis presented in Table 4 by recording the number of days
elapsed since the last trauma run for each paramedic and adding it as a regressor
to equation (7). Under this mechanism of skill decay, pre-hospital times that follow longer periods of inactivity may be lengthier. The results, reported in the upper
panel of Table 5, indicate that additional days of trauma inactivity carry a small but
statistically significant cost, suggesting that an additional day of inactivity is associated with pre-hospital intervals that are on average one second longer. Comparing
estimates of βe and λ in Tables 4 and upper panel of Table 5, omitting length of
inactivity does not appear to confound our estimates.25
In general, periods of inactivity encompass two alternative time uses: one includes
activities that are at least partially relevant to performance, while the other includes
irrelevant tasks. In EMS, non-trauma events such as stroke or cardiac arrest may
have relevance to trauma performance to the extent that they involve similar clinical
interventions and/or patient interaction.
From a learning perspective, adding paramedics’ experience histories with
medical incidents to the specification allows for productivity spillovers in experience across medical and trauma incident types.26 Greater experience with medical
incidents may confer some benefits at the scene of trauma if mechanically similar
25
Note, however, that paramedic volume already captures some of the information contained in our measure
of paramedic inactivity: as the average number of inactive days inversely corresponds to the number of trauma
incidents in a given quarter. Nevertheless, the point estimates in the upper panel of Table 5 indicate slightly more
learning and less forgetting, as expected when controlling for the confounding effect of recent inactivity.
26
Robert S. Huckman and Gary P. Pisano (2006) study same-task transferability for surgeons across different
hospitals and its effect on patient mortality. Our analysis studies potentially heterogeneous skills and their effect on
performance in a single setting.
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tasks are performed in both types of incidents or learning about patient management accrued over medical scenes is transferable to trauma scenes. The middle
panel of Table 5 presents results from estimating equation (7′ ) below, in which
medical experience is added to trauma experience in (7), and is parameterized as
in (1):
(7′ )

M M
M
  + ϕi,t) + β  M
ln OHTikt = βe  ln (λ ei,t−1
e    ln (λ  e  i,t−1 + ϕ  i,t )

 Wit + φt + ηi + εikt
   ,
+ βXXkt  + βW

where an “M” superscript indicates a variable or parameter relating to medical runs.
Using this specification, we find little evidence of transferability across incident
types, as estimates of β
   M
e   are indistinguishable from zero across all models. This
may result from EMS protocols being more well-established for medical events
relative to trauma events (Carr et al. 2006).
In addition to studying transferability of human capital, equation (7′ ) simultaneously explores interference of experience accumulated from medical incidents with
performance at the trauma scene. The scope of tasks that each individual carries
out may interfere with their performance on a given task through weaker memory
retrieval, which may contribute to skill decay (Arthur et al. 1998). The seven percentage point drop in the retention parameter, λ, in the middle panel of Table 5 (relative to Table 4) could be interpreted as evidence of task interference.
Finally, we implement a falsification exercise by estimating the same models
described by equation (7), in which we replace the dependent variable, total outof-hospital time, with an alternative marker of system performance, dispatch time.
Dispatch time is defined as the length of time between a 9-1-1 call and the moment
paramedics are notified and dispatched to the scene. This measure provides the basis
for a credible falsification test as, unlike time spent en route and on-scene, paramedics have no influence on it. Therefore, we do not expect to find a relationship
between individual paramedic experience and dispatch time. The lower panel of
Table 5 validates our performance measure as we find no evidence of learning or
skill decay in the case of dispatch time, lending credibility to our results.
V. Conclusion

Studies of organizational learning and forgetting identify potential channels
through which the firm’s production experience is lost. While the ability to distinguish between these channels has implications for efficient resource allocation
within the firm, to date, their relative importance has largely been ignored. This
paper develops a framework for eliciting the contributions of the two most salient
channels, labor turnover and human capital depreciation, to organizational forgetting. When applying our framework to ambulance companies and their workforce,
we find evidence of organizational forgetting, which results from skill decay and
turnover effects. The latter has twice the magnitude of the former.
Similar to shipbuilding, automobile and aircraft manufacturing, and pizza franchises, where forgetting has been documented, emergency medical services are
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labor intensive, subject to high labor turnover, and learning-by-doing is thought to
be important at the individual worker level.
In some cases, organizational forgetting is associated with breaks in production
and demand volatility. However, organizational forgetting may occur even under
continuous production if individual skills depreciate over time and/or the human
capital of employees is lost to labor turnover. For instance, high observed turnover
rates were hypothesized to cause organizational forgetting in pizza franchises (Darr,
Argote, and Epple 1995). EMS is characterized by high labor turnover as personnel
face a difficult, often hazardous, work environment.27 In our application, we find
that labor turnover accounts for 62 percent of organizational forgetting.
To test whether the large turnover effects we find in EMS are a feature of the
industry or a feature of our framework, we follow Thompson (2007) by adding
hiring and separation rates to the standard reduced form organizational forgetting
specification. In our application, hiring and separation rates neither capture the true
effect of labor turnover nor refine the estimates of organizational forgetting. The
inadequate information embedded in hiring and separation rates suggests that other
studies that lacked the ability to track individuals and therefore relied on firm-level
measures of hiring and separation may have understated turnover effects.
While the bulk of firms and employment in developed countries is concentrated
in the service sector,28 studies of organizational learning and forgetting focus almost
exclusively on large scale industrial settings, such as commercial aircrafts (Benkard
2000), automobile production (Epple, Argote, and Murphy 1996) and ships
(Argote, Beckman, and Epple 1990; Thompson 2001; Rebecca Achee Thornton
and Thompson 2001; Thompson 2007). In these large-scale production endeavors,
organizational forgetting is the result of a mixture of firm and employee level experience depreciation. This is, therefore, a reduced-form phenomenon that encompasses a number of mediators including turnover, literal forgetting by individuals,
and adaptation to technological innovations. Hence, a benefit of studying production of services is the ability to attribute performance to individuals. This is true in
our application; emergency medical services are universal and involve measures of
performance that are attributable to individual paramedics. As discussed earlier, the
ability to track individuals is necessary for eliciting the contributions of labor turnover and human capital depreciation to organizational forgetting.
The ability to attribute performance to individuals in emergency medical services
speaks not only to the richness of our data but also to the nature of production in
service industries, which relies heavily on individual performance (e.g., a mailman,
a dentist, a plumber, or a customer service representative). This, in turn, imposes
limitations for generalizing our findings to settings where there is reliance on joint
production.
27

Paramedics are exposed to potentially infectious bodily fluids, for instance through contact with contaminated
needles, and to the hepatitis B virus (Delbridge et al. 1998). Moreover, they are frequently exposed to the threat of
violence, incur injuries associated with lifting or falling, and face oncoming traffic at the scene of motor vehicle
crashes. Occupational fatality rates for paramedics are comparable to those of police and fire personnel. There are
12.7 fatalities per 100,000 EMS workers annually, which compares with 14.2 for police and 16.5 for firefighters,
and a national average of 5 fatalities across all professions (Brian J. Maguire et al. 2002).
28
For example, the Bureau of Labor Statistics reports that 75 percent of total US employment in 2006 was
concentrated in the service industry.

122

American Economic Journal: Microeconomicsaugust 2011

While services and manufacturing differ in their production environments, ambulance companies do resemble manufacturers in their responsibility for hiring, training, contracting, maintenance of equipment, scheduling, and strategic planning.
EMS companies provide service elements that individual paramedics are not able
to provide in isolation. For example, around-the-clock coverage is a key contractible feature of emergency services. Our analysis suggests that about a quarter of the
firm’s stock of experience existing at the beginning of the year survives to the end
of the year. This reduced form estimate is lower than recent findings for an aircraft
manufacturer (about 60 percent according to Benkard 2000), close to the 35 percent
for Liberty shipbuilders (Thompson 2007), and higher than the 5 percent estimated
by Darr, Argote, and Epple (1995) in the case of pizza franchises. This may suggest
that a firm’s ability to mitigate organizational forgetting is weaker in the tertiary sector, and calls for additional studies of service delivery.
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